Rationalising safety cases for naval systems
; and , 17th International Naval Engineering Conference & Exhibition, Liverpool, UK. IMarEST. doi:10.24868/11189
Abstract
As naval systems become more complex, it is increasingly challenging to provide assurance that they can be operated safely. Safety cases need to be cost-effective to produce, yet robust in delivering a well-founded argument for the safety of the overall capability system. There is the potential to spend disproportionate effort demonstrating the safety of relatively simple, well-understood equipment; while not necessarily applying enough effort to understand how system elements function together to deliver a safe overall system. Increasingly, naval capabilities are assembled as a system-of-systems, bringing together a mix of bespoke, off-the-shelf and legacy elements, including both onboard and offboard systems. Such complex systems need a systems engineering approach to system safety. This paper examines some of the work underway to help rationalise and streamline management of safety cases for complex systems, including IEC 63187, the international standard currently being drafted for systems engineering, system safety and complex systems in defence applications; and Def Stan 02-904, the new UK Defence Standard on Surface Ship Safety Critical Items.